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A

SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

By JoYcE 0. HERTZLER
New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. xii, 559. $8.95
Communication is not an end in itself. It is, in fact, the
elemental social process - the social technique upon which all social
processes depend. Its elemental significance rests upon the fact that
without it there can be no semantic transfer.
If the premise that communication is the touchstone of all social
interaction is to be accepted and understood in depth, then language,
the primary vehicle of communication, must be analyzed in terms of
its sociological nexus. Such is the thesis of Professor Joyce 0. Hertzler, in his book entitled, A Sociology of Language. Professor Hertzler engages in an extensive examination of the interplay between
language systems and social systems in order to demonstrate the
importance of language as a molder and motivator of society.
The book offers the reader a general orientation to the study
of language and communication. However, the tone of A Sociology
of Language suggests that a greater understanding of language and
its sociological ramifications is necessary.
It is the purpose of this book review to consider some of Professor Hertzler's theories concerning the general relationship of
language and society in order to relate them to the more specific
issues contained in the relationship between language and law. In
the following pages the general suggestion will be raised that there
is a need for research in the area of law and communication: in the
language of the courts as it affects the pronouncement of rules, in
the language of the profession as it affects the client, and in the
language of the law student as it affects his own peculiar socialization process of "legal professionalization."
THE LANGUAGE OF THE COURTS

In Professor Hertzler's analysis of the relationship between
language and society, one of the chief functions ascribed to language
is its role as an agency of social control - "that is, its role in regulating, directing, adjusting and organizing the social conduct of individuals and groups in the interest of effective societal operation.
Social control becomes impossible without a linguistic system."
If one adopts the proposition that the ultimate and official
social control system is the legal system, and that the final arbiters
of social control are the courts, then one is led to inquire into the
relationship between language and the courts in order to determine
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whether the task of social control is effectively being carried out.
The elements of social control described by Professor Hertzler require
the use of language in order that they may be communicated to society.
The right kind of language is basic: (1) in understanding the
prohibitions and requirements of behavior, (2) in presenting rules
and directives, (3) in articulating public opinion behind these
sanctions, and (4) in conducting the formal and informal agencies
for administering and enforcing the sanctions.
The utilization of language by the courts as a function of social
control is manifested by the pronouncement of rules of law. The
observations made by Professor Hertzler seem to assume that some
kind of stability underlies the rules and that the decisions of those
vested with the power of social control are in some way predictable
for a given state of facts. These assumptions follow the traditional
philosophy of jurisprudence, which would reject speculation on or
search for ultimate origins of sense experience. The principle of
stare decisis demands stability and predictability in the law, and the
traditionalist courts would look to the language of the past as precedent for the resolution of present conflicts in society.
Yet we must be aware that society itself is not always stable
and that its norms are constantly changing to meet the times. The
legal realists as long ago as the turn of the twentieth century raised
grave doubts concerning the underlying stability and predictability
of the legal process of social control. Their thesis maintained that
law (as an expression of social control) is what the courts say it is
from case to case. Predictability of pronouncements of social control
to the legal realists was impossible without a clear understanding of
the empirical facts underlying both the case at issue and the public
policy of the times.
Although legal realism may have overstated its case somewhat
in an effort to shatter the notion of dogmatic predictability in the
legal system, it did give rise to a healthy skepticism concerning the
"rule of law" and its place in the social control process. The word
or rule should not stand alone as a symbol of behavioral control.
Professor Hertzler discusses the importance of the word as a symbol
for society, yet his observations are equally applicable to the symbolic importance of the rule of law.
The importance of a symbol does not lie in its intrinsic
properties; the symbol stands for, refers to, indicates something
else. It is a representation of conceptualized things, actions, occurrences, qualities, or relationships - a surrogate or substitute,
not the object or happening itself.
In the same way in which a word is a representation of conceptualized things and relationships, so also is a rule of law a conceptual representation of social attitudes and policies. The key to
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predictability in the social control process lies in the empirical examination of the underlying social concepts which give rise to the rule
expressed in a given decision. Without an analysis of these concepts,
there is a further danger that through a semantic "process of abstraction" a rule of law may be generalized to such an extent that it is
applied almost indiscriminately to a conflict. Such an application
may in fact prevent the solution of a problem. Professor Hertzler
notes that words as symbols tend to canalize perception and response,
focusing attention only on some aspects of things or events and not
on others. This may also be true for rules.
Some of the fundamental causes of this process of abstraction
are engrained in legal method. Law students are taught to "brief"
cases, to boil them down, presenting the facts, the issue, and the
holding as the distilled ingredients of the controversy. Then they
are asked to abstract from this distillate a "rule of the case," a general principle that will magically apply to all "similar" controversies.
The fact of the matter is, however, that most controversies are not
truly similar. Society is composed of individuals. Thus, when conflicts arise, they are individual conflicts, sociologically distinct from
any other controversy, past, present, or future.
Given the notion of the uniqueness of every controversy, a
caveat is posed for both the legal profession and society when one
makes an isolated statement about what the law is. We cannot be
certain about the basis of such a statement, and we do not know
its factual or social referent. The rule standing alone is ambiguous,
and, just as the general semanticist searches for the experiential referent of a word, so must we find empirically the sociological referent of the rule.
Language and law are both tools of society, and unless there is
an awareness of how and why these tools are used, they have little
meaning.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE PROFESSION

The subject of "special" languages of the language community
is considered in rather general terms in A Sociology of Language,
and the problem of estrangement of special groups from society by
virtue of their language is discussed. The legal profession is clearly
capable of inclusion among the special classes of society, and "lawyer's talk" is distinct from the language of the lay community to a
great extent. In an analysis of the relationship between language
and the legal system, the problem is to isolate both the positive and
negative effects of lawyer's talk with respect to the client. Given
the capacity of a special language to isolate its speakers from the
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general language community, is there a concurrent benefit to be
derived in the lawyer-client communication situation?
In order to resolve this question, it is first necessary to understand the purposes of a special language. Professor Hertzler suggests that three general functions of special languages are readily
discernible: (1) to mystify the ignorant, (2) to hide the special
group's lack of knowledge and their unsolved problems, and (3)
to cover up personal and emotional involvements. He suggests that
one function of the language of the legal profession is that of concealment and defense, when he writes, "Some of the professions
affect some terminology to enhance the mysteries of their craft.
There is the solemn verbosity of lawyers . . . who thereby are able
systematically to conceal their actual thoughts and feelings."
While there may be some truth to the observation that one
function of lawyer's talk is for purposes of camouflage, this alone
does not serve to answer the central issue. The answer lies partly in
the awareness of what might be called the multiordinal aspect of
all language. Words, including the words of lawyers, are incomplete
symbols - their meaning is unknown until the context in which they
are used is understood. The lawyer in court would indeed be expected to use his special language for a different purpose than the
lawyer who is counselling a client, even though the words may
sound the same in both situations. It must be realized that the
lawyer-client situation carries with it a variety of role expectations
on the part of the lawyer. A client seeking a divorce might require
that the lawyer assume the role of psychologist or family counselor.
Similarly, a corporation-client may require a businessman's role of
the attorney. Each choice of roles demands an appropriate choice
of language from the lawyer.
One of the primary functions of the lawyer's technical language
is as a means of "conceptual shorthand." One word for the lawyer,
such as "estoppel" or "due process" can serve to communicate a
highly abstract and complex legal principle. Lawyer's talk, therefore,
must of necessity be sufficiently specific for the articulation of a
legal proposition, yet at the same time flexible enough to relate the
proposition to reality in terms which the listener can comprehend.
Otherwise, as Professor Hertzler notes, the lawyer becomes the viccure
e.
t .of his own.veria..., rend erig his l.......f
than the abstract legal principles which it states.
Another aspect of the language of law, discussed earlier in the
context of the language of the courts, is its function of social control.
This same function can be performed by lawyer's talk in the counselling situation. The special language of law can create an aura of
authority for the lawyer. In the normal lawyer-client situation, it is
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assumed that the client has come to his attorney because he has a
problem which only a lawyer can solve. The client looks to the
attorney for advice, for some sort of answer. Thus, it is generally
the lawyer who has the power to control the communication situation
by his use of the language. Professor Hertzler refers to this power
as "word grip."
The verbal act- an utterance in the form of a word or a phrase,
or a sequence of these-coupled with the manner in which it is
uttered, is capable of setting in motion a force which influences,
even controls, persons and situations. "Words are acts... and they
function as acts."
Lawyer's talk can serve a useful persuasive function in a counselling
situation; a function which ultimately depends for its success on the
lawyer's skill in its use, based on an awareness of the relationship
between language and social reality.
The lawyer-client situation presents an aspect of communication not always found in the study of the language of the courts in
the case reports. This is the concept of "feedback," that is, the interplay of the communication of ideas between people. In the study
of legal rules, the emphasis is predominantly on the written form
contained in the statutes and case reports. There is no interplay of
ideas to indicate that the rule contained in the written form has been
communicated in a meaningful sense. The lawyer-client situation,
however, provides an opportunity for the lawyer to test the value
of his special language as a vehicle for the communication of rules
through the principle of feedback. When a lawyer employs his lawyer's talk in a given counselling situation, his experiential frame of
reference may be entirely different from that of his client, yet the
abstract language spoken may trigger a response in the client based
on his own experiential frame of reference. The abstract legal terminology may be open to a variety of interpretations by the client, yet
communication will not be achieved.
Through the process of feedback, the alert lawyer can analyze
the responses of his client to his use of lawyer's language in an attempt to make certain that their frames of reference converge. It
may be that, since each person has somewhat different experiential
referents for his environment, a complete "meeting of the minds"
can never be achieved. However, once the lawyer becomes aware
of the difficulties inherent in language, he can at least approximate
"total communication" with his client.
Finally, the special language of the legal profession, by virtue
of its capacity to exclude the non-speaking layman, has the ability
to breed solidarity among its own members. Professor Hertzler
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observes that this exclusive-inclusive effect is shared in common
by all special language groups.
The special language assists in keeping the distinction between
member and non-member clear, and identifies the members of the
in-group in contrast to the out-groups, setting them definitely apart
from all others. Closely related to this is the fact that the special
language has a cohesive, solidarity-producing effect among its
speakers. It symbolizes the strength of the ties between them and
serves as a prop to in-groupness."
In terms of the legal profession, lawyer's talk seems to be a sort
of double-edged sword. On the one hand, legal terminology and the
misuse thereof may become as meaningless to the layman as jabberwocky, thereby confusing the clients the attorney seeks to serve. On
the other, lawyer's language properly used can operate efficiently as
both a persuasive communication vehicle with the client and also as
a contribution to the sense of solidarity necessary for the maintenance
of a profession.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW STUDENT

The examination of the language of the law student as he
undergoes the peculiar socialization process of "legal professionalization" is essential to the understanding of the relationship between
language and law, since the way in which this future lawyer, legislator or judge utilizes the language will ultimately affect both the
language of the profession and the language of the courts in the
articulation and analysis of rules.
The entering law student comes from a variety of sociological
backgrounds. He has already undergone a socialization process conditioned by his own particular environment, and therefore his language referents would be presumably well formed by the time he
enters law school. Yet, in his first year of legal study, he must undergo a totally new socialization process, and this requirement must
undoubtedly affect his use of language. The freshman law student
soon learns that he is expected "to think and act like a lawyer."
This new role expectation thrust upon the law student must carry
with it the notion that part of the role of thinking and acting like
a lawyer is talking like a lawyer. Once exposed to the legal terminology in his casebooks, the student soon learns (or think he learns)
how lawyers talk. However, it has already been indicated that the
way lawyers talk must be considered in terms of social reality. Professor Hertzler points out that
every language . . . unavoidably has a tangential philosophical,
more specifically, a logical aspect, if it is to serve its fundamental
communicative purposes. This involves, first, the relationship of
linguistic forms to facts. The user of the language must be concerned
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with validity, the extent to which his statements conform to reality,
or else he is prating untruth, gibberish, or nonsense.

As the student progresses through his first year of legal studies
and into his second and third, he may mellow somewhat in his eagerness to fulfill his new role expectation. He probably outgrows the
notion that "to talk like a lawyer is to be a lawyer," yet some of its
effects will probably remain with him and be reflected in his language. He has learned that such words as "estoppel," "battery,"
and "due process" are useful additions to his legal vocabulary, and
his experiential frame of reference for such terms lies probably within
the pages of his casebooks, not in the social reality to which he was

previously accustomed. Thus, his communication to others of such
concepts may be devoid of any sociological nexus in reality, possibly
understandable to his fellow students and the profession, but probably totally meaningless in a real sense to his future client.
Once the law student has learned his new legal language, he
may be unconsciously confined by it in his future activities. The
notion that perceptions of the world on the part of any given group
are controlled, to a great extent, by the language of the group is
known as the "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis." Professor Hertzler describes it as follows:
As human begins live in the objective world and the world of
social activity, they are "very much at the mercy of the particular
language which has become the medium of expression for their
society." . . . The "social patterns called words" affect even our
simple acts of perception. "We see and hear and otherwise experience as we do because the language habits of our community
predispose certain choices of interpretation."

The language community of the law student is, to a great extent, the law school. If his perception is confined and conditioned
by the language of his casebooks and peers, the effect may be a
perpetuation of his isolation from social reality. Perhaps this is one
reason why the attorney just graduated from law school finds that
the rules he learned in law school "don't work the way they were
supposed to" in practice.
The challenge presented to legal education is obvious: to bridge
the linguistic gap between the law student on the inside and society
on the outside. Student practice programs in some law schools do
much in this respect, but an exposure to the elements of language
and communication theory as it relates to the social world is also
necessary.
Given the general orientation to the relationship between language and society described in A Sociology of Language, together
with an awareness of the problems involved when this concept is
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applied to the relationship between language and law, the need for
continuing research in the area of law and communication is obvious.
The awareness that much of the language of law is in the
written form of cases, statutes and administrative rulings might mislead the researcher into a notion of finality in the law, which would
make any search for predictability somewhat easier. The written
form of language seems less amenable to change. Yet, the fact that
every problem that confronts the court or the lawyer has its roots in
a unique sociological frame of reference suggests that a routine
rhetorical treatment of it is not entirely adequate in a communication sense. An empirical approach is called for in such situations.
It may very well be that an empirical approach to legal language is impossible or impractical in some cases. The rhetorical use
of language may prove beneficial to maintain some sort of stability
in the rules, which is necessary for a system of social control, and
important for cohesiveness in the profession. Law and language,
however, are inextricably bound to a social nexus, and the fact that
law cannot be separated from human behavior calls for at least an
awareness of the sociological referent of the language and the rule.
Timothy B. Walker

